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Abstract: The sign of the relationship between expected stock market returns and volatility appears to
vary over time, a result that seems at odds with basic notions of risk and return. In this paper we
construct an economy where production involves the use of both labor and capital as inputs. We show
that when capital investment is “sticky,” the sign of the relation between stock market risk and return
varies in accordance with the supply of labor but requires no time variation in preferences. In particular,
we show that for asset market equilibria where firms face an elastic supply of labor, the traditional
positive risk-return relation obtains. Conversely, a negative relation obtains for asset market equilibria
where there is positive probability that labor supply will be highly inelastic. A nice feature of our model
is that, unlike earlier work, the sign of the stock market risk-return relation can be associated with
observable features of the business cycle. Post–World War II macroeconomic and stock return data are
used to test the predictions from the model. Using standard measures of stock market volatility, our
results provide support for a stock market risk-return relation that is negative at the peaks of business
cycles and positive at the troughs.
JEL classification: E23, E34, G12
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1. Introduction
Standard models for pricing aggregate risk imply, for fixed preferences and a stationary
supply of output, that changes in aggregate risk should always be positively associated with changes
in expected return. However, the empirical evidence, starting with Black (1976), suggests otherwise.
Since then different authors have found conflicting signs for the time series relationship between
expected stock returns and return volatility. For example, French, Schwert and Stambaugh (FSS,
1987) find evidence of a positive relation between monthly expected returns on a broad index of
stocks and the level of predictable volatility. Conversely, Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (GJR,
1993) find support for a negative relation between the first two conditional moments. More recently,
Whitelaw (1994) provides evidence that the conditional volatility of stock market returns leads
conditional returns. Specifically, he finds that returns are positively correlated with past values of
conditional volatility and negatively correlated with future values of conditional volatility.
Moreover, his measures of expected return vary countercyclically in the context of the business
cycle, a result consistent with the earlier work of Fama and French (1989) and others.
In this regard, it is reasonable to expect business cycle variables such as investment and
employment to have an impact on the stock market since stocks are just claims to cash flows from
real assets.
1 Indeed, Barro (1990) finds that changes in stock prices have substantial explanatory
power for one period ahead gross private domestic investment.These papers, when combined,
                                                
1 The procyclical nature of investment and employment has been extensively documented in the business cycle
literature. For instance, Boldrin and Horvath (1995) report correlations of 0.81 between investment and output, and a
correlation of 0.88 between labor hours and output.2
suggest an interesting approach that one might use to explain how the risk-return relation in
securities markets changes over the business cycle.
First, we believe that Whitelaw’s  (1994) results may be evidence that the relation
between the first two conditional moments of stock returns changes signs over specific phases of the
business cycle. Second, the results in Barro (1990) are suggestive of the idea that expected stock
returns are determined, at least in part, by the factors of real production, including investment,
employment, and the underlying risk in the economy.  Finally, it is known that there is at least a
weak link between conditional volatility in financial markets and measures of macroeconomic risk
(Schwert (1989)).
2  The challenge is to explain if and why the sign of the relationship between
expected returns and macroeconomic risk switches, depending on the level of investment and
employment.  The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to construct a theoretical model that explains
the time varying relation between expected stock market returns and volatility, link this variation to
changes in investment and employment, and provide some empirical validation for the model using
standard data and econometric techniques.
Previous theoretical work  (Barsky 1989, Abel 1988, and Naik 1994) establishes
conditions under which expected stock market returns will be negatively or positively related to
risk, depending on investor preferences regarding intertemporal substitution.
3  However, these
models do not, for fixed preferences, generate changes in the sign of the relation between risk and
                                                
2 For purposes of discussion, we distinguish between macroeconomic risk and stock market risk. Macroeconomic risk
is referred to as “risk”, while stock market risk is referred to as “volatility in the stock market” or  “volatility” when
there is no ambiguity.
3 With Expected Utility preferences, the coefficient of relative risk aversion governs both risk aversion and the aversion
to intertemporal substitution. In this case, a sufficient condition for a negative relation between risk and stock returns is
that the coefficient of relative risk aversion be greater than one (Barsky 1989, Abel 1988).  For non EU preferences, a
sufficient condition is that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution be less than one (Barsky 1989, Naik 1994.)3
expected returns over time.
4  The reason that the risk-return relation can not switch signs in these
models is the assumed independence between the mean and variance of the dividend process.
Backus and Gregory (1993) drop this independence assumption and are therefore able to
generate the changes in sign. In their framework, the correlation between the mean and volatility of
the dividend process is exogenous. Indeed, one of the lessons from their work is that by assuming a
richer, albeit exogenous, dividend process one is able to generate a positive, negative or no
relationship between the moments of stock returns. Thus, in order to derive testable restrictions on
the data, we model an economy where the moments of dividends are endogenous.
5  In particular,
we show that the correlation between the mean and the volatility of dividends will depend on the
level of investment and employment, as well as the underlying risk in the economy.
Our results linking the moments of the endogenous dividend process to risk draw on the
insights developed in the literature regarding investment and uncertainty by Caballero (1991),
Pindyck (1993) and others. Specifically, Caballero provides conditions under which an increase in
risk may lead to a decrease in investment.  We are aware of Pindyck’s (1993) critique of Caballero’s
results that the conclusions are limited to isolated firms, and are not valid for industry wide increases
in demand uncertainty.
We overcome this criticism by analyzing a model with production uncertainty whereby
the finiteness of factor inputs, labor and capital, creates both constant and decreasing returns to scale.
A high level of endogenously determined investment implies decreasing returns, whereas a low level
of investment implies constant returns to scale, since the demand for labor is increasing in the level
                                                
4 Intuitively, in these models, an increase in risk affects expected returns in the following manner: Risk averse investors suffer a
decline in utility expected from future consumption.  If they are (not) very averse to intertemporal substitution, they allocate
greater (smaller) resources to future consumption in response.  Since the supply of future consumption is imperfectly elastic, an
increase (decrease) in demand leads to a decrease (increase) in expected returns.4
of real investment.  As in Caballero, we obtain a positive as well as a negative investment-
uncertainty relation in our framework. Moreover, by introducing a simple financial market, we are
able to trace out the implications of this last result in terms of the first two conditional moments of
stock returns. In particular, we are able to show that in economies characterized by low levels of
investment (representing “poor” economic conditions), the relationship between the moments is
positive and vice versa in economies where the level of investment is high.
We are able to derive the above results without assuming that any of the agents in the
economy are risk averse, although a subset of agents (investors) are assumed to be averse to
intertemporal substitution. When combined with earlier work by, for example, Barsky (1989), who
shows that risk aversion alone is not sufficient to generate a determinate sign on the risk-return
relationship, our model highlights the importance of aversion to intertemporal substitution for
explaining co-movements in the moments of stock returns over time.
  The framework used here also allows us to test several predictions relating the co-
movements of risk and return to simple proxies for investment, employment and risk. Preliminary
results suggest that the data are entirely consistent with the theory presented here. Indeed, we find
that time varying relationship between the first two moments of stock returns exhibits the same time
series pattern and lead-lag structure documented by Whitelaw (1994).
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a description
of the model and the development of equilibrium in real and financial markets. In section 3 we
provide comparative static results with respect to the underlying parameters in the economy. Section
                                                                                                                                                
5 We are aware of the argument that any exogenous dividend process can be linked back to an equilibrium in some
underlying economy (see, e.g., Duffie (1992)) Our purpose here is to investigate the properties of a dividend process
with time varying equilibrium levels of investment and employment.5
4 contains the empirical specification, data definitions and a discussion of the results. A summary
and suggestions for future research conclude the paper.
2. The Model
We consider a two-date production economy with three types of agents: investors, firms
and workers.
6 All agents are assumed to be risk neutral, although investors are assumed to be averse
to intertemporal substitution. There are a large but finite number of agents of each type and they
behave in a competitive manner.  All agents are assumed to have the same information and are
homogeneous within their class of agents, so we need only consider the decisions of three
representative agents. We discuss each in turn.
Investors:
The representative investor is endowed with W units of the single good, which she
optimally allocates between current consumption and purchase of shares in the firm at date 0.
7  The
ownership of shares entitles the investor to future dividends.  We assume that her time additive
utility of consumption is given by
γ γ − − 1
1
1
0 1 0 )] ( [   +   ] [   =   ) , ( C E C C C U ,   0 < γ  < 1 (1)
                                                
6 The degree of heterogeniety in agents is innocuous, of course, if the set of available financial contracts is complete so
that each agent’s payoffs in equilibrium depend only on aggregate output. For our problem to be of interest, some
incompleteness of contracting is required. Considering three types of agents and restricting the ability of agents to write
contracts on labor’s alternative production technology represents a sufficient level of incompleteness for our purposes.
Otherwise, if the contracting space is complete, it is always possible to construct a “representative” agent and prices
and production decisions will be set as if  there were but a single agent in the economy. Notice that we could, and do in
the empirical section, combine the firm and the investor without any qualitative change in our results.
7In this model, all financial assets constitute claims to cash flows from real assets.  No financial assets are independent
of real assets. The investor can store output risklessly, but this will be dominated if gross expected returns from
investment are greater than one.6
, where C0 = consumption at date 0 and C1 = consumption at date 1.
8   The parameter γ  takes values
on the open interval (0,1).  The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is measured by 1/ γ . However,
unlike earlier work in this area (for example, Barsky (1989) and Naik (1994)), preferences do not
determine the sign of the risk-return relation in this paper since the investor is assumed to be risk
neutral.  Thus, we will show that, in the context of our model, risk aversion is not necessary in order
to generate a time varying relationship between the conditional expectation and volatility of stock
returns.
We define the investor’s demand for expected future dividends as 
D D .  Defining the
gross required (and in equilibrium, expected) returns on the stock as R , a price taking investor will




 for the shares.  Normalizing the number of shares to one and recognizing her
budget constraint, the relevant optimization problem may be equivalently written as
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The representative firm possesses a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale technology
which uses both labor, L, and physical capital, K, to produce date 1 output Y = K
α  L
1- α ε , where ε  ≥  0
is a random shock, with E[ε ] = 1, and α  lies on the interval (0,1).  Investment is made at date 0 and is
irreversible.  The firm finances this investment by selling all shares in the firm to the investor at a
price P.  The objective of the firm is to choose a value of K such that it maximizes the net present
value of investment, i.e., maximizes (P - K).
                                                
8 In line with earlier work, we assume that investors display aversion to intertemporal substitution but separate this
from risk aversion. In particular, we show that risk aversion is not a necessary condition to get a time varying
relationship between expected returns and risk. Moreover, adding risk aversion, but at the same time keeping our
contracting frictions (see footnote 3) will not change the results.7
Denoting a particular realization of dividends supplied by D






for its shares, where 
S D  is the expected future dividend supplied. Since the firm takes R  as given,






−    Maximize  (3)
At date 1, the firm experiences a shock of ε  and since capital investment is irreversible,
only labor demand can be adjusted by the firm ex post. At this point the labor market also clears,
production takes place and the resulting output is distributed in the form of wages and dividends.
9
Workers:
The representative worker is endowed with N units of labor along with an alternative
production technology which requires only labor input and yields w > 0, per unit of labor input.  We
also assume that the worker has no disutility of effort.  Hence, the supply curve of labor is perfectly
elastic (at a wage of w) in states where the demand for labor is less than N units and is perfectly
inelastic in states where labor demand exceeds N units.
10
Our assumption regarding the irreversibility of investment, when combined with a finite
supply of labor, has real economic consequences in equilibrium.  In particular, a higher level of
investment ex ante is more likely to result in high demand for labor ex post and in higher wages. It
follows from these assumptions that, unlike results in the previous literature, equilibrium expected
returns on physical capital are decreasing or constant in the level of investment.
Equilibrium:
                                                
9 Since the firm does not carry any debt, the only claimants to future cash flows are the worker and the investor.
10 If w = 0, then the firm’s demand for labor will be unbounded in all states of the world, since labor’s marginal product
is always positive with a Cobb-Douglas production technology.8
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that both the firm and the investor’s decisions
are, in equilibrium, determined by the required rate of return. In particular, we define an equilibrium
as a pair  ( ) ( )
* * *   , R R K  such that the investor’s optimal demand for expected future dividends 
* D D
and the firm’s optimal supply of expected future dividends 
* S D  are equal, where the “
* ” sign
denotes equilibrium values of the variables. We first discuss the supply correspondence and then
turn our attention to the demand function and the properties of our economy in equilibrium.
Supply of Expected Dividends:
Since investment is irreversible and is made before ε  is realized, the firm chooses K
* by
recursively taking into consideration the optimal date 1 labor input decision.  As always, the date 1
hiring decision is optimal only if the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate.  In our set-up
the marginal product of labor is given by MPL = (1-α ) K
α  L
- α ε .  Since N is finite and there is no
disutility of effort, there are two possibilities:
i.    MPL   = (1-α ) K
α  L
-α ε   = w, for L < N, or
ii.   MPL   = (1-α ) K
α  L 
-α ε  ≥  w, for L = N.
Clearly, there exists an ε , call it “c”, that solves (1-α ) K
α N 
-α ε   = w, i.e., 
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 units of labor at a wage of w. Since L
* < N,
we label such labor market conditions as “slack.”  For ε  > c, wages adjust upward to equal the
worker’s marginal product, and L
* = N.  We label these labor market conditions “tight.”  For fixed N,
w, and α , it is clear that the probability of realizing a slack or tight labor market is determined by K,
e.g., high levels of K are associated with a lower probability of slack labor markets.  More generally,9
the probability that labor market conditions will be either slack or tight is determined endogenously
through the choice of K.
We assume, for specificity, that the random shock ε  is distributed uniformly on the
interval [1-θ , 1+θ ] where θ  ∈  (0,1).  The density function is given by f (ε ) = 1/(2θ ).
11  Notice that c ≥
1+θ , c ≤  1-θ , or c ∈ (1-θ , 1+θ ).  Incorporating the optimal hiring decision for the firm, it follows that




































































































S          (5)
Equation (5) formalizes the notion that expected future dividends are a function of initial
investment, labor endowment and the probability of being in tight labor markets.  It is also easy to
see from (5) that 
S D  is strictly increasing and continuous in K.
Solving for the optimal level of investment in the standard recursive fashion, and
denoting partial differentiation by subscripts, we have, from (3),
R D
S
K    = (6)
as a necessary condition for equilibrium, where,
                                                
11 While we have worked out some of the results using arbitrary probability measures, the uniform is both tractable and




































































































It is easy to see, from (6`), that over the range c ≥  1+θ , 
S
K D  is independent of K, while for
c < 1+θ , 
S
K D  is declining in K.
12  The optimal level of investment is shown in Figure 1.  It is clear
that the lower the required return on financial assets, the higher the level of desired investment.
Note that the firm optimally invests zero when expected returns on financial assets are greater than
marginal expected returns on real assets.
 13  The case where c ≥  1+θ   (slack labor markets in all
states) corresponds to a situation where the firm faces constant returns to scale with respect to K and
is therefore indifferent between various possible levels of investment.  Alternatively, for c < 1+θ ,
there is positive probability of tight labor markets ex post and the firm faces decreasing returns to
scale with respect to K.  In this case () R K
*  is a strictly decreasing function of R .
From (5), for fixed values of the exogenous parameters,  () R D
S*  is strictly increasing in,
and uniquely determined by  () R K
* .  Therefore, we are able to prove the following lemma, which
will be useful in characterizing the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
 Lemma 1:  () R K
*  and () R D
S*  are both convex valued upper hemicontinuous correspondences in
R .
                                                
12 We note that S
K D  is continuous, but not everywhere differentiable in initial investment.  In particular,  S
KK D  is not
defined for c ∈  {1-θ , 1+θ. }. This fact is taken into account when we later do the comparative static exercises.
13 Despite the fact that the Cobb-Douglas production function meets the Inada conditions, marginal expected returns on
real assets are bounded above, owing to the expost adjustability of labor.11
Proof:  See Appendix A.
Demand for Expected Dividends:
We now consider how the investor determines her demand for expected future dividends.
The demand schedule can be specified by using (2) to derive the first order necessary condition for
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Given equation (7), it is straightforward to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2: 
* D D is a continuous and strictly increasing function of R , for given W.
Proof: Differentiate both sides of equation (7) with respect to R .  This yields
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which is clearly positive since γ , W, and R are strictly positive.♦
We note that Lemma 2 follows directly from the assumption that the investor is averse to
intertemporal substitution. We are now prepared to prove that an equilibrium exists and that it is
unique. These results are summarized in the following theorem and corollary.
Theorem 1: There exists a pair  ( ) ( )
* * * ,R R K  for which  ( )
* * R D
S = ( )
* * R D
D .
Proof: See Appendix A.
Corollary 1: The equilibrium in Theorem 1 is unique.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Intuitively, existence follows from the fact that R determines both () R D
S*  and () R D
D* .
For very low values of R , () R D
D*  is close to zero. Conversely, for very high values ofR , () R D
S*  is12
zero. From the continuity and convex valuedness of  () R D
S*  and () R D
D* , it follows that there will
exist an intermediate level of R =
* R , for which  ( )
* * R D
S  and ( )
* * R D
D  are equal. Uniqueness
follows from the fact that () R D
D*  is strictly increasing in R .  Figure 2 provides a graphical
representation of this discussion.
Note that the equilibrium pair  ( ) ( )
* * * ,R R K can be identified by ( )
* * R K  alone since the
inverse mapping  ) (
* *
K R  is a single valued non-increasing continuous function (this can also be
seen from Figure 1.)  The identification of an equilibrium by K
* alone is useful since it implies, for
given w, N, and α ,  a unique probability of being in slack labor markets.  Moreover, different values
of K
* imply different probabilities of being in slack or tight labor markets.  We now show that, for
different levels of W, different levels of K
* are feasible equilibria.
Theorem 2: Different levels of W result in different levels of K
*.
Proof of Theorem 2: Pick a W. It is clear from (7) that the mapping between  () R D
D*  and W is, for a
given R , one to one.  Solve equation (7) to find the associated () R D
D*   Also, from the existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium, the mapping between  () R D
D*  and K
* is also one to one.  Therefore, there
exists a unique K
*
 associated with a given value of W.♦
Theorem 2 shows that any level of investment is a feasible equilibrium, given an
appropriate initial endowment, W.  This result makes intuitive sense because the investor can convert
current resources into future consumption only through investment in the firm. Therefore, by varying
her endowment, it is possible to obtain any level of equilibrium investment and its associated
probability of slack labor markets. This result is important since we argue that the different values of13
K
* and c are representative of different phases of the business cycle.  Empirical business cycle
research suggests that this is indeed the case.
14,15
3.  Comparative Static Results
In this section we examine how a small change in any of the exogenous parameters (N, w,
W, θ ) may affect our equilibrium level of 
* R .
16  In addition, we also present results about the impact
of a change in risk, θ , on stock market volatility, σ
2. We will use these comparative static results
later to help specify our testable hypotheses.  The two different sets of equilibria that are of interest
to us are c > 1+θ , where the equilibrium level of investment is said to be low, and 1-θ   < c < 1+θ ,
where the equilibrium level of investment is said to be high. The comparative static results pertain to
these two cases.
The primary result of interest is the impact of changes in θ  on 
* R and σ
2.  Given our
distributional assumptions, risk is uniquely defined by θ .  We first establish some lemmas that relate
S D  to θ .  Specifically, we show that for low levels of investment, 
* R and σ
2 are increasing in θ . We
also show that there exist high levels of investment such that 
* R  is decreasing and σ
2 is increasing in
θ .  Thus, we establish that there exist asset market equilibria where the traditional theory holds, and
there exist equilibria where it is “reversed”. We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3: If  θ + > 1 c , 
S Dθ  >0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
                                                
14 As discussed in the introduction, investment is very procyclical over the business cycle, as is employment.  Clearly, a
low c would be associated with high investment and employment (as in a boom.)  On the other hand, a high c would be
associated with low investment and employment (as in a recession.)
15 We are aware of Abel’s (1988) argument that, strictly speaking, a two-date model such as this can only be used to
compare two different economies and not the same economy over time. However, we still feel that these results are
suggestive to the extent that certain values of the observed equilibrium are typically associated with certain phases of
the business cycle.14
When levels of investment are low, realized dividends, D
S, are convex and increasing in ε
for all possible values of ε , on account of the hiring flexibility in labor markets (see Figure 3).
Therefore, an increase in risk in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) shifts the weight of the
distribution towards the tails.  Using Jensen’s Inequality and the convexity of dividends in ε , it
follows that an increase in risk actually results in higher values of 
S D .
17  Using this result, we can
now prove the following theorem.










  > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Intuitively, if equilibrium investment levels are low, production is constant returns to
scale and the firm earns no economic profits.  Therefore, returns to real assets are the same, in
equilibrium, as returns on financial assets.
18  Moreover, Lemma 3 shows that an increase in θ  results
in an increase in 
S D .  This increase flows through to holders of financial assets.  Also, as one might
expect, an increase in θ  leads to an increase in σ
2.
We next consider equilibria where the level of investment is high, so that the firm faces
tight labor markets with positive probability. In this case, even though D
S is piecewise convex in ε
(see Figure 4), there exist equilibria such that it is globally concave in the state realization. It follows
that a mean preserving spread in risk will not always increase
S D , i.e., there exist equilibria
where
S D  is decreasing in θ .  In this case the result in Lemma 3 is reversed. More formally, we can
prove
                                                                                                                                                
16 Comparative statics have been derived for the impact of the exogenous parameters on both equilibrium investment
and expected stock returns.  However, only the latter are presented here, since those are of primary interest in this
paper.
17 In this case it turns out that investment is also increasing in θ , a result first obtained by Hartman (1972).15
Lemma 4: If 
2 2 2 1 ) 1 ( θ θ − < < − c , 
S Dθ  < 0.
Proof:  See Appendix A.
We are now prepared to prove our main result.
Theorem 4: If 











Proof:  See Appendix A.
The intuition behind the proof of Theorem 4 comes from the fact that there exist
equilibria such that an increase in θ  reduces 
S D . Moreover, Lemma 2 shows that the investor’s
required rate of return is strictly increasing in 
D D .  From the existence of equilibrium,
* D will
decline, as will 
* R .  This generates the first part of Theorem 4.  Finally, when θ  ≥  0.5, we are able to
show that σ
2 is an increasing function of θ , thus establishing the second part of the theorem.
 19
In the context of existing literature, the importance of Theorems 3 and 4 comes from the
fact that they provide an equilibrium-based rationale for time variation in the correlation between the
mean and volatility of stock returns over different phases of the business cycle.
We now present comparative static results with respect to changes in N, W, and w.  First,
we consider low levels of investment so that  θ + > 1 c . As one might expect, an increase in w
reduces 
S D since an increase in w results in a higher wage bill. On the other hand, a small change in
N does not change 
S D since the firm already has maximum hiring flexibility. Finally, a change in
                                                                                                                                                
18 Restoy and Rockinger (1994) formalize a simple model where returns on real and financial assets are equal state by
state, if production is constant returns to scale.
19 θ  ≥  0.5 is a sufficient condition to guarantee that stock market volatility and risk will be directly related.  While we
have not established the “genericity” of the result (i.e. stock market volatility always moves in the same direction as
macroeconomic risk,) we do show this result holds for the equilibria under consideration.16
initial endowment, W, does not impact 
S D  since output is independent of W.  The foregoing
discussion is summarized in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5: If  θ + > 1 c , 
S
w D  < 0, and
S
N D  =
S
W D  = 0.
 Proof: See Appendix A.
It is clear from Lemma 5 that an increase in w worsens the opportunity set of the firm
(i.e., 
S D declines).  We next show that this effect flows through directly to financial assets and
results in a decrease in 
* R . Moreover, since N influences the equilibrium only through 
S D , it turns
out that, not surprisingly, changes in N have no effect on 
* R at these equilibria. Conversely, changes
in W influence the equilibrium only through 
D D . However, at these equilibria, production is
constant returns to scale, so that changes in 
D D  are matched by changes in 
S D without any change
in 
* R . A formal statement of these results is presented in Theorem 5.












Proof: See Appendix A.
Finally, we investigate the case where the equilibrium level of investment is high, so that
1-θ   < c < 1+θ . In this case an increase in w increases the firm’s wage bill in slack labor markets,
while an increase in N lets the firm increase hiring when labor markets turn out to be tight. It follows
that 
S D is inversely related to w and directly related to N.  For reasons discussed earlier, an increase
in W leaves
S D unchanged. These results are summarized in the next Lemma.
Lemma 6: If 1-θ   < c < 1+θ , 
S
w D  ≤  0, 
S
N D  > 0, and 
S
W D  = 0.
Proof:  See Appendix A.
We use this lemma to help prove the following theorem.17














Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 6 is true because an increase in N increases 
S D . Ceteris paribus, this leads to a
higher price for shares, which causes the investor to demand a higher expected return on the shares.
An increase in W also affects equilibrium expected returns, since it increases the investor’s demand
for current and future consumption. Moreover, since the firm faces decreasing returns to scale at
high levels of investment, it follows that the desired higher supply of future consumption will be
forthcoming only if the investor is willing to accept a lower expected return.
It is interesting in this framework that at very high levels of investment (i.e. c →  1-θ ),
when labor markets are expected to be tight almost with probability one, an increase in w actually
leads to an increase in 
* R . At these equilibria, an increase in w has very little impact on 
S D  since
the firm pays higher than w wages in most states, anyway.  However, an increase in w increases the
probability of being in slack labor markets, which is valuable at the margin and hence
increases
* D as well as 
* R .
Empirical Specification, Data and Results
Econometric Issues:
In order to specify a general empirical formulation of the model presented in section 2,
one would need to specify a system of equations that generates expected stock returns, volatility and
the level of investment.  Clearly, our focus is the time varying relationship between conditional
expected returns and volatility. Thus, we are not particularly interested in looking at determinants of
the level of investment, but rather incorporating the role of investment in determining the probability18
of being in slack vs. tight labor markets.  From this perspective, the endogeneity of K
* presents the
usual econometric problems associated with inference in a single structural equation.
Interestingly, expected returns can be written in an equation as a function of only w, θ , α 
and c, where c summarizes all of the relevant information contained in K
*, w, and N and represents




























































































































 The endogeneity problem associated with c is eliminated if we simplify the model by
combining the investor and the firm into one agent. This follows from the fact that, in such an
economy, equilibrium is determined by K
* alone. However, average returns are still well defined and
can be used in the empirical tests of the model. Importantly, such a simplification does not alter
earlier predictions regarding the co-movement between the first two moments of stock returns. 
20, 21
A second point involves the fact that our model explains expected returns, not expected
excess returns. The extant literature, however, documents a time varying relation between excess
returns and volatility.  This difference may limit comparability with earlier work. Furthermore, our
model does not address issues of information arrival in the stock market.  If investors are rational
                                                
20 These proofs are available upon request from the authors.




≤  0 everywhere in the simplified
version. Other comparative static results are similar across the two versions. The reason we present a more extended19
and can anticipate real activity, information about future expected investment and dividends should
get incorporated in current returns.
22  Therefore, our empirical tests, which do not adjust for the
information arrival process, are actually biased against finding evidence in support of our
hypotheses.
An empirical model of volatility must also be specified.  There is substantial evidence
that conditional volatility is serially correlated. Therefore, we model stock return volatility using a
GARCH(1,1) process, although the results appear to be robust across various measures of
volatility
23.  It follows from this assumption that we can write realized returns as
   where ,   ~
1 1 + + + = t t t R R ξ (9)






1 1 1 1 t t t t t t t b b b z z σ ξ σ σ ξ + + = ≈ = + + + + (10)
, where    ~
1 + t R and  t R  denote the realized  and expected returns from period t to t+1.
Specification of the Model:
While the above simplifications are sufficient to eliminate any simultaneous equation
bias and provide a widely used measure of volatility, t R  is still a highly nonlinear function and
depends on a number of parameters, some of which may be difficult to estimate.  The key economic
insight from Theorems 3 and 4, however, is that the relationship between expected returns and risk
depends on c, which represents the phase of the business cycle.  In these preliminary tests we
provide an empirical specification that lets us test for this nonlinearity in the simplest manner
possible. First, we make no attempt to estimate the production parameter, α .  We recognize that the
omission of α , to the extent that it varies through time, will cause potential biases in the remaining
                                                                                                                                                
model in Section 2 is that it facilitates future investigation of other interesting relationships, e. g. the relationship
between the level of stock prices and investment over the business cycle.
22 For example, see Fama (1981.)20
parameter estimates. Second, we focus our attention on the simplest non-linear specification that
captures the cyclical variation between risk and expected return. In particular, using the symbols t w ˆ ,
t θ ˆ  and  t c ˆ  to denote empirical proxies for w, θ , and c, we estimate two functional forms for  t R .
24
  ˆ   ) ˆ * ˆ (    ˆ        3 2 1 0 t t t t t w a c a a a R + + + = θ θ (11)
  ˆ )) ˆ log( * ˆ (    ˆ        3 2 1 0 t t t t t w a c a a a R + + + = θ θ    (12)
This empirical specification allows us to smooth out the discontinuities associated with
our theoretical model without losing the ability to test our main hypotheses.
25 As predicted by the
model, a1 and a3 should be negative, while a2 should be positive.  As is typical, these hypotheses are
specified as alternatives in one-tailed tests against the null hypotheses that a1, a2, and a3 = 0.
Note that (11) and (12) differ from each other only in that the former uses  t c ˆ , while the
latter uses log ( t c ˆ ) in the specification. The latter allows us to incorporate an additional potential
source of non-linearity in the dependence of  t R  on  t θ ˆ .
Data
The post World War II period is the longest period in U.S. history for which continuous
data on real investment and labor force are available.  Furthermore, data measurement techniques in
this time period are much more reliable than those employed before the war.
26  Since compensation
                                                                                                                                                
23 We worked with alternative specifications of volatility as can be found in Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) ,
Schwert (1989), or Whitelaw (1994). Our results are robust under these alternate specifications.
24Different specifications yielded surprisingly robust results. Results from alternative specifications are available upon
request.
25 According to the theoretical form of (8), a Markov-Switching regime model might appear to be the best way to test
our model.  However, if one believes that there is some element of aggregation across industries, our approach would
be valid for aggregate stock returns. In future work, we intend to check this assumption by comparing the two
approaches.
26 See, for example, Romer (1986) for a discussion of this issue in the context of employment data.21
and investment data are reported only on a quarterly basis and are needed to calculate  t c ˆ , we use
quarterly macroeconomic data for the years 1948 to 1995.
The empirical proxy we employ for the workers’ reservation wage, w, at time t, denoted
t w ˆ , is the real compensation per employee between dates t-1 and t.  To the extent that wages are
sticky downwards, last period’s real compensation per employee ought to reflect the average
worker’s reservation wage for the current time period.  Real compensation per employee is the total
compensation of employees divided by the number of people employed, deflated by the Consumers
Price Index.  The time series for  t w ˆ  is plotted in Figure 5.
From (4), c is given by  α
α




.  The empirical proxy we use at date t,  t c ˆ , closely
adheres to this functional form except for the omission of α .  In particular,  t c ˆ  is constructed as the
ratio of last period’s unemployment (UNEMPt-1,t) to last period’s real gross private domestic
investment (RGPDIt-1,t), multiplied by the real compensation per employee ( t w ˆ .)
27  Last period’s
unemployment reflects the current period’s availability of labor and last period’s investment may
reflect the level of investment that is likely to be made this period.
28 Given that  t c ˆ  is a continuous
variable, it may be a good measure of the probability of being in slack or tight labor markets.  In
particular, a high level of  t c ˆ  should be associated with a high probability of a slack labor market,
and vice versa.  Figures 6, 7, and 8 plot the time series of real gross private domestic investment,
unemployment and  t c ˆ , respectively. Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Table 1.
                                                
27 We would like to thank the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for making available the relevant macroeconomic data
on their website. Definitions of the macroeconomic aggregates are contained in appendix B.
28 We recognize that there may be better ways to form expectations of investment, using either the information
contained in past stock market returns or other macroeconomic variables.  However, such extensions should only
improve our results.22
Two facts stand out from figures 5 to 8. First, as expected, all four series exhibit some
degree of a time trend, although the time series of  t c ˆ  displays a far lower trend than the other three
series. Indeed, the relatively flat trend and the presence of cyclicality in  t c ˆ  give us reason to believe
that it may act as a good proxy for phases of the business cycle.
29
We follow Schwert (1989) and our proxy for risk at time t, denoted t θ ˆ , is constructed as

















A continuous series of daily stock returns on an index is obtained by splicing a return
series obtained from Schwert (for the period, January 1948 to July 1962) with daily returns on the
CRSP value weighted index (July 1962 to December 1995).
31 Nominal quarterly returns are
computed by taking daily returns and compounding them over quarterly intervals.  The inflation rate
is subtracted from these measures to yield estimates of real stock returns. Finally, as noted earlier,
our proxy for conditional stock return volatility comes from fitting a GARCH(1,1) process for the
error variance.
Results
                                                
29 Augmented Dickey Fuller tests that include a constant, reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for both  t c ˆ and t w ˆ .
30 Schwert actually uses the absolute deviation from the mean but the results are qualitatively similar to those reported
here.
31 Schwert (1990) contains a detailed description of the construction of the return series.23
In Table 2, we present maximum likelihood estimates of (11) and (12) with t-statistics
computed using robust errors as per Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992).  As can be seen from these
results, the sign of the relation between stock returns and risk,  t θ ˆ , depends on the phase of business
cycle ( t c ˆ .)  For high values of  t c ˆ , we see that the relation is positive, while for low values of  t c ˆ , the
relation is negative.
These regression results are clearly consistent with our hypotheses. What is less clear is
whether this behavior of expected returns would manifest itself in the sort of patterns documented by
Whitelaw (1994). Figures 9 and 10 present the correlations between conditional returns and different
leads (lags) of conditional variance, for the specifications of  t R  given by (11) and (12) respectively.
The number on the horizontal axis denotes the number of leads of conditional volatility that are
correlated with conditional return.  For example, -6 denotes the correlation between 
2
6 - t   and   σ t R . The
patterns in Figures 9 and 10 obviously display the same lead-lag relation between conditional returns
and volatility as those found in figures 3 and 5 in Whitelaw.  In particular, conditional returns are
positively related to past values of conditional volatility and negatively related to future values of
conditional volatility.
Finally, we provide some direct evidence that the sign of the relation between conditional
returns and volatility depends on the phase of the business cycle.  Using conditional returns,  t R ,
estimated from (11) and the associated conditional volatility from (10), we run the following least-
squares regressions.
32
                                                
32 The use of conditional volatility estimates as a regressor poses the usual problems associated with generated
regressors.  However, as shown in Pagan (1984), the asymptotic t-statistics are valid in our approach.24
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The results for equations (13) and (14) are contained in Table 3, Panel A.  The evidence
provides strong support for the hypothesized relation between conditional returns and volatility that
depends on the phase of the business cycle.  However, the low value of the Durbin-Watson statistic
is a cause for concern.  To correct for autocorrelation, we estimate equation (15), which is equation
(14) in first differences.









The results for (15) are also reported in Table 3, panel A.  These results provide further evidence in
support of our hypotheses.
In Panel B, we present results for equations (13), (14) and (15) using log( t c ˆ ) instead of
t c ˆ . The results are quite similar to those obtained with  t c ˆ . We also tried using the sum of the
squared daily returns over the quarter as a proxy for conditional volatility.  This measure is identical
to the one in Whitelaw (1994). Tests employing this proxy yielded results that were qualitatively
similar to those reported in the text (see footnote 23).
5. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we provide an equilibrium model where the sign of the co-movement
between the first two conditional moments of stock returns depends on the level of investment and
employment. Specifically, we prove that when the level of investment is high and unemployment is
expected to be low, there exist asset market equilibria such that the relation may be negative.
Conversely, when the level of investment is low and unemployment is expected to be high, there
exist asset market equilibria such that the relation is positive.  Thus, we are able to rationalize, in the
context of an equilibrium model, the fact that the contemporaneous correlation between stock market25
volatility and expected stock returns can, for fixed preferences, vary over the business cycle.
Moreover, unlike previous authors, we show that risk aversion on the part of investors is not
necessary to generate a negative risk-return relation.
  We also find strong empirical support for the model’s predictions. In fact, the empirical
specification of our model generates a lead-lag relationship between conditional stock returns and
volatility that is strikingly similar to that documented in the extant literature. Thus, we have provided
one explanation for why risk and return do not always move in the same direction over time.
In this paper we have intentionally avoided looking at the determinants of the
level of investment and stock prices from an empirical perspective. However, the estimation
of a complete system of equations, as developed here, may help us to better understand the
work that documents the fact that current stock prices provide information concerning future
levels of investment and output. Moreover, the framework used here may also be used to




Figure 1: shows that optimal investment by the firm, ) (
* R K , is a convex valued upper hemi
continuous correspondence in R .
R
) ( R D Supply Demand
Figure 2: shows the Demand and Supply of D , as a function of R .  The existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium can be inferred from the picture.27
ε 1-θ 1+θ
DS
Figure 3: Dividends (D
S) realized in different states (ε ).  When the equilibrium level of investment is




Figure 4: Dividends (D
S) realized in different states (ε ).  When the equilibrium level of investment is
high, dividends are convex in the state realization for states poorer than c.  When the realized states
are better than c, dividends are linear in the state realization.28





















































































Figure 6: Real Gross Private Domestic Investment (RGPDI) for the years 1946 to1995,
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Figure 9: Correlations between the conditional expected returns and leads of conditional
expected volatility for an aggregate stock index. For example, -6 denotes the correlation
between 
2
6 - t   and   σ t R . The conditional returns and variance were obtained from maximum
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Figure 10: Correlations between the conditional expected returns and leads of conditional
expected volatility for an aggregate stock index. For example, -6 denotes the correlation
between 
2
6 - t   and   σ t R . The conditional returns and variance were obtained from maximum
likelihood estimates of 12, including a GARCH(1,1) process for the variance of the error
terms.31
APPENDIX A
Proof of Lemma 1: The firm’s choice of optimal investment  () R K
* is defined implicitly in its first
order condition (6 and 6`).  Using (6 and 6`) and recognizing that c is also a function of K, we can
show that () R K
*  is a convex valued upper hemi continuous (uhc) correspondence in  R .
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  In this case, the firm behaves optimally by not
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R the mapping between  R  and K
* is one-to-one and continuous.
Moreover () R K
























 and is strictly decreasing in  R .
From the above, it is clear that () R K
*  always maps into convex sets and, hence, is convex valued.


























 ≠ ,  () R K
*  is a continuous function in  R .32
To establish the upper hemicontinuity of  () R K
* , we need to show that for any sequence
). ( ) (  that  such   ) ( a    and   e subsequenc a    exists     there ,
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Last, since  () R D
S*  is a monotonically increasing function of  () R K
* , it will also be a convex valued
uhc correspondence in  R .♦
Proof of Theorem 1: Define excess demand as
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*(R ) = 0, and excess demand equals





− γ R R
W
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S D
Moreover, as R  →  0, K
*(R ) →  ∞, and 
* D D  →  0.  Therefore, excess demand is given by
        0.   <     =         0    = ) (   -   ) (
* * ∞ − ∞ − R D R D
S D
Clearly, there exist  ( ) ( )
* * * ,R R K for which excess demand takes on both positive and negative
values. Therefore, there must exist  ( ) ( )
* * * ,R R K  such that excess demand is zero. ♦
Proof of Corollary 1: By contradiction.
Suppose there exist two distinct equilibria,  ( ) ( )
* 1 * 1 * 1 ,R R K  and  ( ) ( )
* 2 * 2 * 2 ,R R K , such that excess
demand at both equilibria equals zero.  Note that ( ) ( )
* 1 * 1 * 1 ,R R K  and  ( ) ( )
* 2 * 2 * 2 ,R R K  are distinct only
if  ( ) ( )
* 2 * 2 * 1 * 1 R K R K ≠  since 
* R  is a single valued and non-increasing function of K
*.
Therefore, assume without loss of generality that  ( ) ( )
* 2 * 2 * 1 * 1 R K R K <  so that 
* 2 * 1 R R ≥ .
But this implies that excess demand in the first equilibrium exceeds that in the second, a
contradiction. ♦
Proof of Lemma 3: We use risk in the sense of a mean preserving spread (Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1971). In our model, an increase in risk is represented by an increase in θ .
Note that
S D  is a real-valued, increasing and strictly convex function of ε .  Therefore, by Jensen’s
inequality,  . 0 >
S Dθ ♦
Proof of Theorem 3:34
From equations (6) and (7) and Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 in the text, we know that an equilibrium
must satisfy
() 0        
1
   
1






    0          
2 = − ≡ R D G
S
K (A2)
D S D D = (A3)
Using the implicit function theorem, the impact of a change in an arbitrary exogenous parameter, x,
on  ( )
* * R K  and 
* R  can be determined by totally differentiating both G
1 and G








.  This operation yields
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Choose x = θ  .  Using (A1), (A2) and (A3), 
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R G .  If equilibrium investment is low, c > 1+θ .  In
this case,    0 =
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θ = . Using these facts and (A4) it follows
that 
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To prove the second part of the theorem, define the variance of stock returns as 
2 σ . From the first
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where 
S D {ε  = a} denotes dividends generated in state a.
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From Lemma 4, we know that 
S Dθ  < 0 over this range.  Moreover, at c
22 1 =− θ , it is easy to show
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It can also be shown that as () () c
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We now show that there exist equilibria over the range ()
2 2 2 1   < - 1   θ θ − < c  such that










c c ′ = ∃ Since
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To prove the second part of the theorem, take the total differential of 
2 σ  with respect to θ .  This
yields   
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 over this range of equilibria.37
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Proof of Lemma 5: When c > 1+θ , 
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KK D .  It follows, using (A4) and Lemma 5, that
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Proof of Lemma 6: Note that for 1-θ  < c < 1+θ ,   
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In this case, it is easy to see that  0.   >  
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Proof of Theorem 6: When 1-θ  < c < 1+θ ,  . 0 <
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APPENDIX B
Data Definitions*
Compensation of Employees is the income accruing to employees as remuneration for their
work.  It is the sum of Wages and Salaries and Supplements to Wages and Salaries.
Wages and Salaries consists of the monetary remuneration of employees, including the
compensation of corporate officers; commissions, tips and bonuses; and receipts in kind that
represent income to the recipients.
Supplements to Wages and Salaries consists of employer contributions to social insurance
and of other labor income.
The Civilian Labor Force: consists of all civilians 16 to 65 years of age not confined to an
institution.  The term civilian is used to exclude members of the armed forces who make up a
small (under 2 percent), but significant part of the labor force.  Effective January 1994, the
labor force does not include discouraged workers.  Discouraged workers are officially
defined as “persons who want a job, are available to take a job, and who had looked for work
within the past year but not within the prior 4 weeks because they believed their search
would be futile  (Employment and Earnings, 1994.)
Employment: A person is defined as being employed if he or she worked at least one hour
per week for pay or profit during the survey period.  A person is also considered as employed
if he or she worked at least 15 hours during the survey week for no pay in a family-owned
business.
Unemployment: A person is defined as being unemployed if he or she is a part of the civilian
labor force, but does not qualify to be considered employed.
Gross Private Domestic Investment is fixed capital goods purchased by private business and
nonprofit institutions, and the value of the change in the physical volume of inventories held
by private business.  The former includes all private purchases of dwellings, whether
purchased for tenant or owner occupancy.  Net purchases of used goods are also included.
* The above definitions are quoted from either the National Income and Product Accounts of
the United States - 1929 to1974 (published by the National Income Division of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce), or from A Guide to Everyday




t θ ˆ : standard deviation in the growth rates of industrial production for the past 12 quarters.
UNEMPt-1,t: number of people unemployed in the United States (000s) between dates
t-1 and t.
RGPDIt-1,t: real gross private domestic investment (in billions of dollars) between dates t-1 and t.
t w ˆ : real compensation per employee, between dates t-1 and t.
t c ˆ : ratio of UNEMPt-1,t to RGPDIt-1,t, multiplied by  t w ˆ .
1
~
+ t R : quarterly stock returns between dates t and t+1.
Variable Name Mean Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
  t θ ˆ 0.02218 0.01234 0.00570 0.07457
UNEMPt-1,t 5487.62 2489.38 1607.00 12051.00
RGPDIt-1,t 4.449 2.249 1.371 23.70
t w ˆ 0.0183 0.0036 0.00988 0.0224
t c ˆ 22.802 7.964 9.302 50.94
Log ( t c ˆ ) 3.065 0.355 2.23 3.93
Unemployment
(percent)
5.747 1.591 2.548 10.849
1
~
+ t R 0.0213 0.0803 -0.275 0.223841
Table 2
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the time varying relation between stock returns and risk, with a
GARCH(1,1) process to adjust for heteroskedasticity.
1
~
+ t R : quarterly stock returns, between dates t and t+1.
t θ ˆ : standard deviation in the growth rates of industrial production for the last 12 quarters.
t w ˆ : real compensation per employee, between dates t-1 and t.
t c ˆ : ratio of UNEMPt-1,t to RGPDIt-1,t, multiplied by  t w ˆ .
1 3 2 1 0 1    ˆ   ) ˆ * ˆ (    ˆ        ~
+ + + + + + = t t t t t t w a c a a a R ξ θ θ (11)
1 3 2 1 0 1    ˆ )) ˆ log( * ˆ (    ˆ         ~
+ + + + + + = t t t t t t w a c a a a R ξ θ θ    (12)






1 1 1 1 t t t t t t t b b b z z σ ξ σ σ ξ + + = ≈ = + + + +
































*  indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
** t-statistics are reported in parentheses, computed as in Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992.)42
Table 3
Evidence on the time varying relation between the first two conditional moments of stock
returns.
t R : predicted quarterly stock returns between dates t and t+1, estimated from (11) and (12).
t c ˆ : ratio of UNEMPt-1,t to RGPDIt-1,t, multiplied by  t w ˆ .
Panel A: 
2
t σ is estimated from (11) and a GARCH(1,1) process on the errors.
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* indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
Panel B: 
2
t σ is estimated from (12) and a GARCH(1,1) process on the errors.
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* indicates significance at the 5 percent level.43
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